Rachel Stohl
Senior Analyst,
Center for Defense Information
Rachel Stohl, an expert on weapons trafficking, talks with us about how the international small arms trade works. Other than Kosovo, where else worldwide have US guns ended up fueling internal wars?
Read Interview
Matt Schroeder
Manager,
The Arms Sales Monitoring Project
Matt Schroeder explains the US laws governing the export of small arms, and reflects on the policy debate. Do these laws apply to civilians, like Florin Krasniqi, who buy weapons in the US and intend to export but not resell them?
Read Interview
Introduction
According to the United Nations, there are over 600 million small arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide, and they account for over half a million deaths per year, including 300,000 in armed conflicts. Of 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, 47 were waged with small arms as the weapons of choice.
The UN states: "Small arms destabilize regions, spark, fuel and prolong conflicts, obstruct relief programs, undermine peace, exacerbate human rights abuses, hamper development and foster a 'culture of violence.' Unlike nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, there are no international treaties or other legal instruments for dealing with these weapons."
We spoke with two experts on the small arms trade to understand the scope of the trade and how the US fits into the global picture.
Rachel Stohl
Senior Analyst,
Center for Defense Information
Rachel Stohl, an expert on weapons trafficking, talks with us about how the international small arms trade works. Other than Kosovo, where else worldwide have US guns ended up fueling internal wars?
Read Interview
Matt Schroeder
Manager,
The Arms Sales Monitoring Project
Matt Schroeder explains the US laws governing the export of small arms, and reflects on the policy debate. Do these laws apply to civilians, like Florin Krasniqi, who buy weapons in the US and intend to export but not resell them?
Read Interview
Rachel Stohl
POV: What kinds of weapons fall under the "small arms" and "light weapons" (SA/LW) category? And is this definition contested, or is there international agreement?
Rachel Stohl: Small arms and light weapons are a subset of what we call conventional weapons. There isn't one official definition for SA/LW, but for the most part people refer to the United Nations definition.
Generally speaking, small arms are guns like revolvers and pistols. Light weapons are weapons like heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-aircraft missiles. For practical purposes, I usually say that SA/LW are weapons you can carry by yourself or with another person, or that you can mount to a vehicle or load on a pack animal. They are one- to two-person weapons.
In 1997, a UN panel on small arms developed a working definition which is the most widely-accepted standard today:
"Simply put, a small arm is one that can be fired, maintained and transported by one person; a light weapon is used by a small crew and transported on a light vehicle or pack animal. This covers such ubiquitous weapons as pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars of less than 100-mm-caliber and shoulder-fired anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles."
Source: United Nations
The definition is sometimes contested for political reasons. Some countries don't want to categorize SA/LW because to do so might limit their trade. With some weapons, the politics have to do with the notion of legitimate civilian possession. But for the most part, in international agreements, and in writing on the topic, we use the UN definition. [See sidebar for details.]
POV: How many of these weapons are available for legal purchase by civilians in the US?
Stohl: This is a hard question to answer because almost none of these weapons are absolutely prohibited from civilian purchase. The jurisdiction for weapons purchasing is left to states, in many cases, and state law can supersede federal law. You can also get a special dispensation to own almost any kind of SA/LW, by petitioning agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). [Learn more about state and federal gun laws in our Resources section.]
POV: The U.S. is the largest arms exporter in the world. When it comes to the small arms trade specifically, does this statistic hold? Do most small arms in circulation originate and/or trade through the US?
Stohl: Not necessarily. We do know that there is a legal trade in small arms worth about $4 billion, and an illicit trade worth $1 billion, but we don't always know exact values for countries by proportion. The largest exporters are the US, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil and China. And most of the big sales are state to state transfers, or commercial companies selling arms to states.
The reason it's difficult to measure is that there isn't a single transparency mechanism for reporting this kind of data. If you look at the conventional weapons category as a whole, there are many data sources for the levels of trade. In the case of SA/LW -- unlike, say, a tank -- individuals, police forces and military forces all have legitimate uses and needs for these weapons. That makes it very difficult to put controls on the trade, and transparency is a method of control. There are also many actors involved -- production of SA/LW happens in over 90 countries, and over 1,200 companies are involved in some aspect of the trade, whether that's production or repair. The bottom line is that there are many of these weapons available very easily from a lot of different sources.
Small arms and light weapons are considered to be a subset of the larger category of conventional weapons. Conventional weapons are distinguished from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (NBC), also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
POV: Is the story that we see in The Brooklyn Connection typical of how the small arms trade functions globally? For example, we watch Florin Krasniqi purchase a .50-caliber rifle, which remains in his possession until he gives it to Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) compatriots abroad. How common is it for light weapons to remain with one single owner from the time when they are initially purchased until they are put into action on the ground? In other words, how much of the small arms trade is trafficked through arms brokers, who buy and resell weapons? How much involves civilians?
Stohl: This really depends on the purpose of the arms, the destination and the quantity. What you described above, straw purchasing, is a very common method of getting guns into Mexico or Canada from the U.S. If you are talking about the conflict in Chiapas, or in Central America, this is a common scenario.
That is not the case if you are talking about, for example, moving weapons from France or Belgium to Sierra Leone. The conflict in Sierra Leone was more protracted than the Kosovo conflict. There were more actors involved, and a lack of recognized government. In such conflicts, the arms transfer might be a large shipload of weapons trafficked through a major arms broker, rather than small piecemeal transfers, though that of course can still happen.
POV: In The Brooklyn Connection we see how legal gun purchases in the U.S. have ended up fueling violent conflict in Kosovo. Today most of the world's armed conflicts are similar to the warfare in Kosovo -- they are so-called "internal" wars, sustained by these kinds of light weapons. Where else worldwide have guns purchased legally in the U.S. found their way to warfare?
Stohl: There are approximately 639 million SA/LW in circulation worldwide right now. It's hard to track the life-cycle of these weapons, especially during times of war. You can use serial numbers, but those can be removed, and not all countries use them to mark weapons.
But certainly wars in Central America, South America, and Mexico have been fought with U.S. weapons. Brazil has had problems with street crimes being committed with guns of U.S. origin. I believe Human Rights Watch found evidence of U.S. guns in Liberia. Southern Asia, especially the Philippines, still has a lot of U.S. weapons, and there were also weapons left from the Vietnam War which remain in the region. Stinger missiles that the U.S. supplied to the mujaheeden in Afghanistan in the 1980s were used against us in the war with the Taliban. [See interview with Matt Schroeder for more details about the Stinger trades.] And I believe that when they've done weapons collection in Iraq they have found U.S. guns.
POV: What basic recommendations would you make for how the U.S. could help limit the proliferation of small arms globally?
Stohl: The U.S. should support the creation of legally binding international treaties on arms brokering, marking and tracing, and arms export criteria. We should strengthen end-use monitoring and pre-license checks through the Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry end-use monitoring programs. We should demonstrate leadership on small arms through bilateral relationships and in regional and multilateral fora, such as the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations by pushing for higher international standards, to ensure the adoption of effective regulations governing arms exports and imports and controls over arms brokers. And we should expand assistance programs to states seeking more effective implementation and enforcement of arms export laws, regulations, and procedures, including providing increased law enforcement and export control training.
Rachel Stohl is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC. Her areas of expertise include the international arms trade, conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons, landmines, child soldiers and the United Nations. Prior to joining CDI, Ms. Stohl was a Herbert Scoville Peace Fellow at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), and she previously worked at the United Nations Center for Disarmament Affairs and at the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion. She has a MA in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Matt Schroeder
POV: What kinds of laws are on the books controlling the export of small arms from the US? Is it possible to estimate how often these laws are strictly enforced? How, and to what degree, does the U.S. monitor the "end-use" of these weapons -- how they are sold, who the recipients are, how they are used?
Matt Schroeder: U.S. controls on firearms exports are some of the best in the world. All commercial exports require a license from the State Department, and only exporters that are registered with the State Department are eligible to apply for a license. This is true regardless of the quantity or type of firearms requested (with a few exceptions). Each license request is individually reviewed by a trained State Department licensing officer. The licensing officer checks the names that appear on the application against government watch lists of individuals and companies that are prohibited from selling and receiving U.S. arms exports, and also scrutinizes the accompanying documentation for forgeries or signs of fraud. When applicable, they seek input from other bureaus within and outside of the State Department. Through these pre-license checks, the State Department has prevented dozens of potentially harmful firearms transfers.
The UN definition of small arms and light weapons:
"Simply put, a small arm is one that can be fired, maintained and transported by one person; a light weapon is used by a small crew and transported on a light vehicle or pack animal."
License requests that make it through the review process are approved for export only if the applicant submits a certificate from the foreign government authorizing the import. In many cases, the importer must also sign documents obligating them to obtain U.S. government approval before retransferring the imported firearms.
Government oversight of small arms does not end when the weapons leave U.S. shores. Both the State and the Defense Departments operate end-use monitoring programs that conduct post-shipment verification checks of exported weapons. In 2004, the State Department conducted 221 post-shipment checks.*
POV: Do these laws apply to civilians purchasing weapons here who intend to export but not resell?
Schroeder: Nearly all firearms exports require a license from the State Department (except shotguns, which are licensed by the Commerce Department). The only exceptions are:
- firearms components (except barrels, cylinders, frames, and complete breech mechanisms) valued at less than $100;
- Firearms manufactured before 1898;
- Temporary export of up to 3 non-automatic firearms but only if they are for the exclusive use of an American citizen and are not retransferred to other parties;
- Non-automatic firearms for the personal use of members of the U.S. armed forces and government personnel. Retransfer of these firearms is not permitted, and these individuals are not allowed to take with them more than 1000 rounds of ammunition.**
POV: Is it possible to estimate how much of the small arms trade from or through the U.S. is monitored and regulated, and how much flies under the radar, legally and illegally? For example, are there hundreds of civilians like Florin Krasniqi living in the U.S. and supplying weapons to conflicts abroad using legal means? What about using illegal means?
Schroeder: Gauging the legal trade in U.S. small arms is relatively easy. Reports and databases compiled by the State Department, Defense Department and Census bureau provide a fairly complete picture of legal firearms exports. In contrast, the illicit trade in U.S. small arms is extremely opaque. Most of the publicly available information about such transfers is anecdotal, consisting primarily of government and media reports on intercepted shipments. While these reports are often quite detailed, they only provide information on trafficking attempts that are detected by law enforcement officials.
Most of the annual government reports on arms exports are available on the FAS website.
POV: In July 2001, the UN held a conference on the illicit trade of small arms. At the conference, John Bolton -- Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and now the Bush administration nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the UN -- stated the U.S. position on a proposed UN accord.
Among other concerns, he mentioned that limiting trade of SA/LW solely to governments would "preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal government." Many people agree that limiting the trade of weapons to prevent global violence is a good goal, but does Under-Secretary Bolton have a point? What about "freedom fighters"?
Schroeder: Only the most ardent pacifist would argue that there is never cause to take up arms against an oppressive regime, and that the international community does not have a moral right to assist populations resisting such regimes. But arming non-state actors is fraught with danger and should be the option of last resort.
Generally speaking, rebel groups do not have the capacity to prevent their members from transferring weapons to unauthorized end-users. As a result, small arms and light weapons provided to rebel groups in the past have ended up in the hands of hostile governments and terrorists. The Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles exported to the Afghan rebels in the 1980s is a classic example. The missiles were remarkably effective against the dreaded Soviet Hind gunships, which decimated the poorly equipped but courageous Afghan rebels. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, however, the missiles became a proliferation nightmare. Hundreds of the estimated 2000 missiles sent to the rebels disappeared despite efforts by the CIA to buy them back. The Iranians acquired several of them. Others reportedly ended up in the arsenals of the Taliban, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Chechen Rebels and al Qaeda. *** Mercifully, the missing Stingers have not been used against U.S. airliners, but the threat that such weapons pose to air travelers is very real.
POV: What basic recommendations would you make for how the U.S. could help limit the proliferation of small arms globally?
Schroeder: In many ways, the United States already leads the pack in efforts to curb illicit arms transfers. U.S. controls on brokers, end-use monitoring programs, and retransfer restrictions are some of the best in the world. Through foreign aid programs, the U.S. also helps other governments to strengthen their export controls, monitor their borders and secure or destroy government small arms stockpiles.***
That said, the U.S. can do more. Below are two important steps that policymakers should take immediately:
1) Ratify the Organization of American States (OAS) Firearms Convention. The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, also known as the OAS Firearms Convention, is a practical, no-nonsense tool for improving arms export controls, increasing cooperation and information-sharing among member states, and helping investigators dismantle arms trafficking networks. Despite early U.S. support for the Convention, the United States is now one of a handful of countries that has not ratified it. U.S. ratification would boost the credibility of the Convention and, in turn, the Convention's ability to shape the policies of other governments. Visit the FAS website for more information on the OAS Firearms Convention.
2) Fully fund the State Department's Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) Destruction Program. The SA/LW destruction program provides technical and financial assistance to governments that need help securing their small arms stockpiles or destroying surplus weaponry. Since 2001, the program has paid for the destruction of over 700,000 surplus small arms, including 10,700 deadly shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. This accomplishment is even more remarkable considering how little funding the program receives. Last year, Congress appropriated just $7 million for the program -- $2 million less than the amount requested by the President in his annual foreign aid budget.
Congress is likely to do the same thing this year. Despite the program's obvious benefits, the House voted to appropriate only $7 million for the program for fiscal year 2006. Since the Senate's version of the appropriations bill fully funds the president's $8.75 million request, the final amount will be determined when the House and the Senate convene a conference committee to iron out differences between their bills. In budgetary terms, the $1.75 million difference is insignificant; it will neither make nor break Congressional efforts to balance the budget. Programmatically, however, the difference is critical. The funding requests for destruction programs in the Sudan, Cambodia, the Philippines, Albania, Belarus, and Bulgaria combined is less than $1.75 million. If the House gets its way and the President's budget request is not fully funded, several of these or other country-specific destruction programs will have to be delayed or scaled back.
Visit the State Department's website for more information on the SA/LW destruction program or read "Controlling the Most Dangerous Weapons."
Matt Schroeder is the Manager of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project. Since joining the Federation of American Scientists in February 2002, he has researched and written on U.S. arms export policies, illicit arms trafficking, and terrorism and small arms. Articles he has written have appeared in the Baltimore Sun, San Diego Union-Tribune, Defense News, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. He is also the author of Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms Convention. He received a master's degree in international security policy from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.
* For more information, see the State Department's annual end-use monitoring report.
** For more information, see the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations.
*** Thomas Hunter, "The Proliferation of MANPADS," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 2001. See also Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
**** For more information, see "MANPADS Proliferation," FAS Issue Brief #1.