The Film
Better This World reconstructs the story of the relationship between friends Bradley Crowder and David McKay and grassroots relief organization co-founder Brandon Darby and the twists and turns of their legal cases.
Growing up in Midland, Texas, Bradley Crowder and David McKay received little political education beyond their parents' encouragement to "stand up for the oppressed" and "stand up for what you believe in." Somewhere along the way, partly during late-night walks through their town's deserted streets, the friends began to form their own interpretation of their parents' words. It was Crowder who made the first public statement of his political beliefs. In 2003, when the United States declared war on Iraq, he drew an upside-down American flag with the words "No War" on a T-shirt and wore it to his high school the next day &mdash a move that, he recounts, "became a pretty dramatic event."
Seeking "something else," Crowder and McKay moved to more progressive Austin, where they met Brandon Darby, who had gained prominence as the co-founder of Common Ground Relief, a grassroots relief organization that fed and housed thousands of victims of Hurricane Katrina. Crowder and McKay were flattered when the larger-than-life activist approached them at a bookstore in Austin to talk about organizing together.
As several people in the film who knew Darby, Crowder and McKay recount, Darby urged the young men to become more radical -- to take more extreme actions. According to Larra Elliott, one of the activists who accompanied the three to the RNC, "Brandon [was] talking and he said something that caught my attention, like, 'Don't you feel that firebombs and armed militias . . . don't you feel like that kind of action is necessary sometimes?' And Brad was like, 'No, I don't feel that way.' Brandon would not leave it alone."
Darby echoes some of this sentiment in letters to his FBI handler about meetings with McKay and Crowder, writing, "I told them that direct action is intense, and we could all expect to have violence used against us. I told them I was ready to deal with that, and if they weren't, then they shouldn't work with me."
On August 28, 2008, Crowder and McKay joined Darby and several other activists Darby had brought together for the long van ride up to the RNC, where they would join thousands of other protestors. Within days Crowder and McKay were under arrest. The "Texas Two," as they came to be known, faced multiple domestic terrorism charges, agonizing legal decisions and decades in prison. Darby, until then their mentor, would be the government's star witness against them.
Better This World reconstructs the story of the relationship between these three men and the twists and turns of their legal cases through interviews with Crowder, McKay and their family members; interviews with FBI agents and attorneys; and a wealth of intriguing surveillance and archival footage -- presenting an extraordinarily well-documented account and untangling a web of questions: Why did Darby, a committed activist, become a government informant? What led these young men to build eight homemade bombs? Did Darby and law enforcement save innocent victims from domestic terrorists bent on violence and destruction? Or were Crowder and McKay impressionable disciples set up by overzealous agents and a dangerous provocateur? Or does the answer lie somewhere in between?
In September 2008, thousands of delegates, officials and members of the news media descended on the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul for the Republican National Convention (RNC), as did thousands of protesters who wanted to speak out against issues ranging from the Iraq War to the economy to environmental policy.
Two years prior to the 2008 RNC, Minneapolis-St. Paul was designated a "homeland security site" and the FBI began "preventative" intelligence operations nationwide, including sending informants into many activist circles. As FBI special agent Christopher Langert says, "We, the FBI and the federal and state and local governments, knew that there were go[ing to] be some people that were go[ing to] come to St. Paul to do more than just demonstrate, more than just express their grievances. They were going to try to block delegates, cause destruction and . . . criminal activity."
In anticipation of demonstrations, the St. Paul police department formed a small group of police officers informally referred to as the free speech liaison team, or dialogue officers. These officers were tasked with establishing networks of open communication between law enforcement and demonstrators to preempt any tensions building during the lead-up to the convention. Their preventative measures included printing brochures informing protestors of their rights. The brochures state that protestors' rights to demonstrate in public areas are protected under the First Amendment, and police and government officials may only place "non-discriminatory and narrowly drawn 'time, place and manner' restrictions" on these rights. Permits may be required for certain events, but permits "cannot be denied because the event is controversial or will express unpopular views." The brochures also explained that engaging in unlawful acts, such as blocking traffic, destroying property, harassing people or trespassing on private property, is not protected by the First Amendment.
Over the course of the convention, from September 1 to September 4, when John McCain was announced as the Republican presidential candidate and Sarah Palin as his running mate, thousands peacefully participated in marches and other organized events. According to The Wall Street Journal, some protesters turned to smashing windows, clashing with police, slashing tires, throwing bags of human waste and confronting Republican delegates on the street. St. Paul police responded with pepper spray, tear gas, smoke canisters and what police called "distraction devices."
On September 4, the last day of the convention, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and mainstream media outlets reported that police arrested more than 300 people in St. Paul and about 100 people in Minneapolis. In Minneapolis, all but a handful were cited and released immediately, while in St. Paul, the vast majority were charged with gross misdemeanors or felonies and held for 36 hours, at which point individuals had to be charged or released in accordance with Minnesota law.
But the final night of the convention brought the largest show of force as hundreds of antiwar protesters rallied at the state capitol and tried to march to the convention center without a permit. According to Democracy Now!, hundreds of riot police arrived on the scene, using snowplows, horses and dump trucks to seal off downtown from the demonstrators. Protesters continued marching, and police employed concussion grenades, smoke bombs and pepper spray. The march ended with more than 200 demonstrators trapped on a bridge and hundreds of police in riot gear blocking them on either side. According to the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, 672 people were jailed over the course of the convention, 442 of whom later had their charges either dropped or dismissed.
In the wake of the convention, the ACLU called for an investigation into possible violations of the First and Fourth Amendments, including the arrest of reporters trying to gather the news, the mass arrest of hundreds of peaceful protesters, surveillance of and subsequent raids on several activist groups and private homes and the confiscation by law enforcement agents of constitutionally-protected private property.
In January 2009, the city of St. Paul released a report examining both the successes and shortcomings of its response to the 2008 RNC and made numerous suggestions for how future convention cities should prepare for such an event.
Sources:
» American Civil Liberties Union: "ACLU Renews Its Call For Investigation Into Civil Liberties Violations At RNC"
» American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota: "Annual Report 2008-09"
» American Civil Liberties Union: "At Arraignment Court in St. Paul"
» Associated Press: "Nearly 300 Arrested at RNC Convention Protest"
» Democracy Now!: "Eight Members of RNC Activist Group Lodged With Terrorism Charges"
» Democracy Now!: "Nearly 400 Arrested on Last Day of RNC, Including Over a Dozen Media Workers"
» The Wall Street Journal: "Republican Convention Sees Violent Demonstrations"
» The New York Times: "As Throngs of Protesters Hit Streets, Dozens Are Arrested After Clashes"
» Saint Paul: "Report of the Republican National Convention Public Safety Planning and Implementation Review Commission"
» The Christian Science Monitor: "Protests at RNC Test Appropriate Response"
» The New York Times "G.O.P. Convention Has Police Alert and Protesters Planning"
The Code of Laws of the United States of America defines domestic terrorism as "activities that: (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping. (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
Counterterrorism Policy
At the helm of the domestic counterterrorism effort is the FBI, which works closely with state, local and other federal agencies to gather, archive and analyze massive amounts of information on U.S. citizens and residents when law enforcement officers or fellow citizens believe they are acting suspiciously.
Days after the 9/11 attacks, then-recently appointed FBI director Robert Mueller sent his field offices a memo that made prevention of any future terrorist attacks the FBI's "one set of priorities." According to the FBI's website, the FBI "needed to become more adept at preventing terrorist attacks, not just investigating them after the fact." The key to actualizing these priorities, said Mueller, was intelligence. In November 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice began conducting investigations, seeking individuals whose intentions, rather than actions, constituted a threat.
Journalist Petra Bartosiewicz of Harper's Magazine recently compared the post-9/11 changes to those made at other crucial moments in American history. She writes, "In the run-up to World War I, President Woodrow Wilson decried the danger of 'hyphenated Americans,' pointing specifically to Irish and German immigrants. During World War II, 110,000 Japanese Americans were interned without cause. These reactions were obviously hysterical, but were also temporary; the more recent emergency measures, however, have been institutionalized as a permanent law-enforcement priority."
According to a 2010 investigation by The Washington Post, there are currently 3,984 federal, state and local organizations working on domestic counterterrorism. Of those, 934 have been created since the 9/11 attacks. Since 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has awarded $31 billion in grants to state and local governments to improve their ability to find and protect against terrorists.
The U.S. Department of Justice reports that while the U.S. government has carried out more than 1,000 prosecutions of people it labels as terrorists since 9/11, only one -- an Egyptian immigrant who opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport in 2002 -- committed a terrorist act in the United States during that time.
The USA PATRIOT Act
In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed on December 6, 2002. The USA PATRIOT Act reduces restrictions on law-enforcement officials' ability to gather and share information on suspected terrorists.
One of the provisions provided by the act is the sharing of information between intelligence and criminal investigators, which expands the scope of investigations and cooperation between departments. Additionally, in terrorism investigations, federal judges now have the authority to grant search warrants outside their districts, including providing access to electronic sources such as emails, and the authority to issue "sneak and peek" warrants, which authorities may use to search homes or businesses before notifying the suspects. "Roving wiretaps" now permit investigators to follow suspects continuously through various devices, including cell phones, Blackberry devices and computers, without requiring separate court authorization for each. The group of people the FBI can pursue has also expanded to include anyone who supports terrorist organizations by providing them material resources.
Among the more recent initiatives of the USA PATRIOT Act was the establishment of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which the FBI defines as "small cells of highly trained, locally based, passionately committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It is a multi-agency effort led by the Justice Department and FBI designed to combine the resources of federal, state and local law enforcement."
Critics of the USA PATRIOT Act maintain that such provisions lack the transparency to prevent abuses, allowing the government to access and amass information about, as well as search the properties of, non-criminal citizens. The FBI defends its change in practices against public criticism of its constitutionality. In a 2004 statement, FBI director Robert Mueller said, "Many of our counterterrorism successes, in fact, are the direct results of provisions included in the Act . . . Without them, the FBI could be forced back into pre-September 11 practices, attempting to fight the war on terrorism with one hand tied behind our backs."
On May 27, 2011, President Obama signed into law a four-year extension of the Patriot Act.
To read the full act, click here.
Sources:
» NPR: "The Patriot Act: Key Controversies"
» American Civil Liberties Union: "How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines 'Domestic Terrorism'"
» Harper's Magazine: "To Catch A Terrorist"
» FBI: "Domestic Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era"
» FBI: "A New Era of National Security, 2001-2008"
» FBI: "Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces"
» FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 76, no. 12 (December 2007)
» Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: "USA PATRIOT Act"
» Office of the Law Revision Counsel: "United States Code"
» PBS NewsHour: "Lesson Plan: Homegrown Terrorism - a Major Domestic Security Problem"
» The Washington Post: "Monitoring America"
The use of FBI informants is an integral part of the government's response to threats of terrorism in the United States.
Shortly after the end of WWI, during the Red Scare of the 1950s into the 1970s, the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) infiltrated and spied on communist and civil rights organizations. Now, today's FBI campaign has been dubbed the "Green Scare" and the target is primarily environmental and animal rights activists. Since 2006, 14 members of the Earth Liberation Front have been convicted in FBI cases that have involved informants. One man has been sentenced to 20 years in prison for conspiring to bomb one or more targets, including a federal facility for tree genetics, a federal dam and fish hatchery and a cell phone tower.
According to a recent article in The New Yorker, the FBI maintains more than 15,000 informants. These informants can collect evidence that government agents would need court orders to collect. The informants are often paid thousands of dollars -- in some cases even hundreds of thousands of dollars -- in retainers.
The article states, "In almost every successful case against a large-scale criminal enterprise -- from the one against John Gotti's Mob operation to those involving terrorists plotting against New York synagogues and subways -- an informant has played a central role."
The U.S. Department of Justice identifies several different classes of informants:
A confidential informant is any individual who provides useful and credible information to a Justice Law Enforcement Agency (JLEA) regarding felonious criminal activities and from whom the JLEA expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible information regarding such activities in the future.
Cooperating witnesses differ from confidential informants in that cooperating witnesses agree to testify in legal proceedings and typically have written agreements with the U.S. Department of Justice (usually with an assistant U.S. attorney) that spell out their obligations and their expectations of future judicial or prosecutive consideration.
Sources of information, in contrast, provide information to law enforcement only as a result of legitimate routine access to information or records. The U.S. Department of Justice explains that sources do not collect information by means of criminal association with the subjects of an investigation, while confidential informants and cooperating witnesses often do.
The use of informants has been standard at the FBI since 1961, when J. Edgar Hoover instructed agents to "develop particularly qualified, live sources within the upper echelon of the organized hoodlum element who will be capable of furnishing the quality information" needed to attack organized crime. In 1978, the FBI formed its current criminal informant program, designed to develop a bank of informants who could assist FBI investigations.
Informants, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, "are often uniquely situated to assist the FBI in its most sensitive investigations. They may be involved in criminal activities or enterprises themselves, may be recruited by the FBI because of their access and status and, since they will not testify in court, usually can preserve their anonymity." These sources are approved for use in cases involving organized crime, domestic and international terrorism, white-collar crime, drugs, civil rights, cyber crime, gangs and major theft, among other crimes. While informants are instructed about the limits to their authority, they are authorized to perpetrate some crimes as necessary to their duties and as defined by the department.
The use of such sources has become essential to FBI operations, with informants -- including "privileged" informants, such as attorneys, clergy and physicians -- supplying short -- to long-term services.
However, the use of informants does present certain challenges. Working with informants often means working with people who are themselves engaged in criminal activity. According to Philip B. Heymann, the former deputy attorney general and assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division, "some informants are responsible citizens who report suspected criminal activities without any hope of return. In the middle, other informants live in the midst of the criminal underworld and inform largely for cash. Still others, at the other pole, are charged with serious crimes and cooperate with law enforcement officials in return for the hope or promise of leniency."
Informants are not official employees of the FBI, but many receive compensation for their services; they are screened for suitability before they enter into relationships with the FBI and are screened periodically thereafter.
A 2005 report from the Office of the Inspector General investigating FBI compliance with the attorney general's investigative guidelines found significant problems in the FBI's compliance with the guidelines' provisions, including serious shortcomings in the supervision and administration of the criminal informant program. Specifically, it was found that cumbersome paperwork and inadequate support from FBI headquarters and certain field offices led agents either to avoid using informants or to use informants who were not properly registered.
Discussing the role of informants on its website, the FBI writes, "use of informants to assist in the investigation of criminal activity may involve an element of deception, intrusion into the privacy of individuals or cooperation with persons whose reliability and motivation may be open to question. . . . [S]pecial care is taken to carefully evaluate and closely supervise their use so the rights of individuals under investigation are not infringed."
Many defendants in cases that involve informants have accused informants of entrapment, meaning the defendants were not predisposed to commit crimes, nor would they have done so without the influence of the informants. According to NPR counterterrorism correspondent Dina Temple-Raston, not a single entrapment defense since September 11 has been successful.
Sources:
» Associated Press: "FBI Chief Defends Use of Informants in Mosques"
» Harper's Magazine: "To Catch A Terrorist"
» FBI: "Frequently Asked Questions"
» Bloomington Independent: "Resistance, dissent and government repression"
» Mother Jones: "How a Radical Leftist Became the FBI's BFF"
» The New Yorker: "The Mark"
» Talk of the Nation: "Entrapment Defense Hasn't Worked in Terror Cases"
» U.S. Department of Justice: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Compliance with the Attorney General's Investigative Guidelines"